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Constructing identity through symbols by groups demanding self-
determination: Bosnian Serbs and Iraqi Kurds 
Revised draft for Ethnopolitics 
Zeynep N. Kaya and Outi Keranen 
 
Abstract 
This contribution revisits the question over which much ink has been spilled in 
the study of national self-determination; who are the people? More specifically, 
we ask how national identity in self-determination claims is constructed. 
Drawing on observations from two case studies we submit that cultural/ethnic 
definitions of national identity continue to underwrite self-determination 
claims. We argue that these practices have been central to the process of 
defining and reproducing the group identity on behalf of which the claim to 
political autonomy is made. The use of symbols and practices referring to 
territorially bound distinct nations with different linguistic and cultural 
features compared with other groups inhabiting the state reinforces the 
assertiveness of self-determination claims. Despite their differences, Bosnian 
Serbs and Iraqi Kurds typically follow similar trajectories in their use of ethnic, 
cultural and territorial symbols to reinstate the validity of their demands.  
 
Introduction 
The political and rhetorical currency of one of the most contentious international 
principles of the twentieth century, the right to national self-determination, shows 
no signs of depreciating. The conflicting demands for the right to self-determination 
in Crimea by Ukrainian and Russian populations in 2014 are but one example of the 
principle’s continued potency. The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion 
in 2010 on Kosovo’s independence did not consider the unilateral declaration of 
independence a breach of international law. This decision, coupled with the fact that 
110 UN member states recognised Kosovo’s independence, implies a reduced 
importance of obstacles to realising self-determination demands of separatist 
groups (Wolff & Rodt, 2013). The criticisms levelled by early critics of the principle 
are no less pertinent today; issues to do with its content, its bearers and 
implementation continue to define the debates (Margalit & Raz, 1990). At the same 
time, the profound tension between the promise of political autonomy to oppressed 
communities held by the right to national self-determination and the continued 
primacy of state sovereignty enabling rejection of such claims by states remain.  
These and a number of other problematiques underpinning national self-
determination have inspired a substantial body of literature. Analyses ranging from 
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legal and political to normative have sought to address issues such as conceptual 
shifts in the right to self-determination (Beran, 1984; Buchanan, 2003; Griffiths, 
2003; Hannum, 1996; Koskenniemi, 1994), institutional solutions to the 
secessionist demands of separatist groups (Horowitz, 1994; Moore, 1998; O’Leary & 
McEvoy, 2013) and the relationship between norms and practices of sovereignty, 
nationalism and self-determination (Fabry, 2010; Mayall, 2013). These scholarly 
debates provide useful explanatory and normative insights to understanding the 
resonance of self-determination and the continuing political fragmentation of world 
territory. Yet, this theorising has predominantly operated at the macro-level; on the 
whole it lacks a systemic micro-level study of groups demanding self-
determination.i Moreover, the use of national symbols to promote and present 
national unity is a significant component of the micro-level analysis on nationalist 
group strategy to cultivate group awareness. When established on ethnic symbols to 
emphasise unity of identity, the political assertiveness of separatist nationalisms 
increases (Heraclides, 1991). 
Smith’s ethnosymbolist approach explains the resonance of nationalism and 
national identity with ethnic, cultural, linguistic and territorial symbols. According 
to Smith “naming and self-definition and the cultivation of shared symbols, myths, 
values and traditions” are common characteristics of both nations and ethnic 
communities (Smith, 2009, p. 30). Smith uses the concept of ethnie, which he 
considers as the pre-modern origin of national identity, meaning “named human 
populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an 
association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity” (Smith, 1986). He 
perceives an ethnie as the pre-modern root of a nation, and nations as modern 
constructs that emerged due to large-scale economic and political transformations 
in Europe. Although Smith considers his approach as modernist, the way he defines 
ethnie renders Smith’s approach more primordialist than modernist.  
Although the ethnosymbolist approach acknowledges the importance of 
historical, political and economic circumstances, its argument on ethnie and 
symbols appear to give resonance to group identity and separatist demands. The 
primordialist dimension of this approach fits well with its ready acceptance by 
nationalists. Kurdish nationalist scholars, for instance, often cite Smith’s approach in 
their study of Kurdish nationalism to explain the resonance of identity (Hassanpour, 
2003). Nationalists tend to adopt primordialist lenses in understanding their 
identity and communicating this understanding to outsiders and would-be nationals. 
Therefore, as Guibernau also argues, despite its cultural focus, the ethnosymbolist 
approach has significant political implications, not always positive, because cultural 
symbols and characteristics implicitly aim to legitimise self-determination demands 
of nationalisms (Guibernau, 2004). 
Building on the potential political implications of ethnosymolist arguments, 
this paper offers an analysis of the ways in which ethnosymbolist claims are 
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embedded in the self-determination demands of two separatist nationalist 
movements, Iraqi Kurds and Bosnian Serbs. The aim is to make tentative 
suggestions on the construction and reiteration of group identity, and the political 
implications of such processes on the self-determination claims of these two groups. 
In both cases we observe a set of similar practices; the use of language politics, 
deployment of communal symbols and spatial practices linking geographical spaces 
with their respective identities. These symbolic practices reproduce and foreground 
ethnic identities, generating a cultural background for the self-determination 
demands of separatist groups. It is important to note that this paper does not take 
primordialist claims on the origins of nations for granted and finds modernist 
accounts on nation-building more convincing. However, it acknowledges the 
instrumentalisation of primordialist or ethnosymbolist claims in providing content 
to political demands such as self-determination. The use of ethnic symbols and 
practices by nationalist, separatist groups is one such strategy, as we illustrate 
below.  
 
Reproducing ‘Self’ 
To begin with, it is useful to briefly elucidate the concept of national self-
determination. This is no easy task; national self-determination is a travelling 
concept, a script that can be used to justify very different sets of demands. In its 
external sense it refers to sovereignty, while internal self-determination is generally 
understood as democracy. At the same time, the logic of self-determination lends 
itself to both statist and secessionist arguments (Koskenniemi, 1994) and can be 
conceived as a legal, political and cultural principle. In its legal form it is a principle 
of international law that grants people the right to define their destinies. It can be 
understood as a political concept in that it asserts peoples’ right to self-rule (De- 
Shalit, 1996) and a cultural principle in that it foregrounds the realisation of the 
cultural rights of groups (Tamir, 1991).  
It is primarily the latter two conceptualisations of national self-
determination referring to the internal aspects of the principle that are of interest to 
us here; the ways in which groups claiming the right to self-rule understand and 
represent their identity on behalf of which the claim is made. We are interested in 
separatist groups with a political aim to reduce and/or transfer the power of central 
government over a particular territory to the population or elites representing the 
population on that territory (Cabestan & Pavkovic, 2013). Both Bosnian Serbs and 
Iraqi Kurds have been represented by nationalist political organisations aiming at 
secession from the state they are located in, and they both seek to achieve this aim 
through self-determinationii.  
Ethnic or national symbols used by Bosnian Serb and Iraqi Kurdish 
nationalists operate as a medium for communicating the perceived distinctive 
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characteristics of their groups. The effectiveness of symbols in presenting group 
identity as distinct derives from the fact that the linguistic, religious, ethnic or 
territorial attributes these symbols represent are usually seen as objective, rather 
than subjective. According to modernist accounts of nationalism, national identity 
and its components are subjective, imagined and/or invented (Anderson, 1991; 
Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). What nationalism does is transform subjectively 
perceived and fluid traits into more concrete and objectively perceived ethnic 
features (Smith, 1981). Making reference to a myth of common descent, shared 
memories and language, and irreplaceable cultural values, is necessary for 
nationalists to generate group solidarity and mobilisation (Smith, 1996,). The self-
determination demands of separatist groups build on such perceptions. According 
to Smith, we should recognise the continuing power of identity and generate 
solutions to enable the implementation of national ideals. Failure to do this will only 
invoke further conflict and instability. This normative undercurrent in Smith’s 
approach fits well with the arguments of nationalist groups about what their future 
should look like; but discussing the normative dimensions of this debate is not the 
aim of this paper.  
The calls for self-determination by Iraqi Kurds and Bosnian Serbs are 
interesting in the sense that similar patterns of legitimisation of their respective 
demands are apparent in cases that are very different. The Bosnian Serbs enjoyed a 
position of power in the Yugoslav Republic and hence opposed its dissolution. The 
bitter war against the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Croats ended in 1995 in an 
internationally-brokered peace agreement that divided the country into two entities, 
one of which (Republika Srpska, RS) is dominated by the Bosnian Serbs. Since the 
war, the Bosnian Serb political program has vacillated between demands for 
outright secession and greater political autonomy within Bosnia.  
The Kurds in Iraq are one of four Kurdish communities in the region, the 
other three residing in Turkey, Syria and Iran.iii They constitute the largest non-
Arab community in Iraq and have not been in a position of power until recently. The 
de facto Kurdish autonomous area was formed in 1991 after the US intervention to 
protect Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s military campaigns. With the 2003 US 
intervention, the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (KRI) with significant political, social and 
economic autonomy was officially established. It is generally accepted by analysts 
and scholars that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) eventually aims for 
independent statehood. The KRG’s representatives recently declared plans to hold a 
referendum to decide on independence, which can be considered as an indicator of 
such intentions. However, the KRG’s plans for a referendum have been postponed 
due to the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham’s advances in Iraq, and also due to the 
limited US support for Kurdish independence derived from the US’s underlying aim 
to keep Iraq united.   
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Language Politics  
The discussion turns now to exploring how the above groups have sought to 
construct identities in an attempt to legitimise claims to self-determination. 
Language is central to any discussion of national identities (Kymlicka & Patten, 
2003) and consequently, the ‘self’ on behalf of which national self-determination 
claims are made. In the cases of Bosnian Serbs and Iraqi Kurds language is one of 
the most significant cultural markers on which their respective nationalisms are 
built.  
The war that tore Bosnia apart resulted in the deconstruction of the common 
Yugoslav language, Serbo-Croatian, and the emergence of separate languages. The 
differences between the languages are minor, mainly based on differences in 
dialects. Scholarly studies in the run up to the war in the early 1990s sought to 
prove a link between specific dialects of Serbo-Croatian and ethnic identities; in 
reality, however, the different dialects and spelling conventions did not correspond 
with the religious and purportedly ethnic boundaries (Greenberg, 1996). Yet, in the 
region where the only substantive signifiers of national identities are religion and 
language (Hammel, 1992), it is perhaps inevitable that language politics has become 
an integral part of the political claims for autonomy. Today the separate languages 
reflect the wider, on-going statebuilding dynamics in the country; while the Bosnian 
Muslims have adopted a number of Turkish words in the vocabulary of the newly 
invented Bosnian language based on Serbo-Croatian (Torsti, 2004), Bosnian Croats 
and Serbs are using scripts and dialects associated with their respective mother 
tongues. Language politics is not, however, merely an issue of semantics or choice of 
alphabet. Not only does the development of distinct languages function to 
reproduce exclusive national identities, but the recent invention of the Bosnian 
language in contrast to the long linguistic pedigree of Croatian and Serbian is often 
cited as a proof that no historic Bosnian nation exists. This serves to highlight the 
distinctiveness of the Bosnian Serb peoples and in doing so, rationalise their 
demands for greater self-determination.  
Similar dynamics can be observed in the case of Iraqi Kurds. The use of 
Kurdish and attempts to make it an official language and standardise it can be 
interpreted as a practice that reproduces distinct Kurdishness. Kurdish nationalism 
makes references to the distinct vernacular practice of Kurds compared to other 
languages in the region, mainly Arabic and Turkish. Kurdish is an Indo-European 
language with four main dialects, Sorani and Kurmanji being numerically the largest 
two. Kurmanji and Sorani speakers can understand each other but the two dialects 
are usually considered as distinct. Kurmanji is usually written in Latin, whereas 
Sorani is in Arabic alphabet. There are also phonological and some grammatical 
differences between the two dialects.iv  The Kurds in Iraq have demanded the 
officialisation of the Kurdish language and its equality with Arabic since the 
formation of the Iraqi state, which was granted in the 2005 Iraqi constitution. The 
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demands for officialisation of Kurdish, as well as standardising the two main 
dialects, has been an important component of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq. In this 
process, the use of Kurdish in public life has been further widened through the 
opening of education institutions and publication houses, television and satellite 
channels which use Kurdish. As Arabic has ceased being the dominant language, 
new generations have begun to share and practice a stronger sense of Kurdistani, 
the idea of being from Iraqi Kurdistan (Aziz, 2011).   
 
State Symbols  
If linguistic practices have sought to reproduce and reinforce the 
distinctiveness of Bosnian Serbs and Kurds at a more abstract level, the use of 
separate state symbols has served as a distinctly visual claim to nationhood. Flags 
and emblems are used as symbols of identities in both cases and have provided 
content to claims on the existence of a distinct identity and efforts to politically 
institutionalise that identity through self-determination.  In the case of the Bosnian 
Serbs, the repertoire of symbols of the new Bosnian state was commissioned and 
imposed (in the absence of domestic consensus) by international actors. The Office 
of the High Representative (OHR), the representative of the international 
community in the country, chose a flag depicting Bosnia’s European future 
symbolised by yellow stars in blue background. The flag was received with little 
enthusiasm; it is predominantly the Bosnian Muslims who fly the flag in the absence 
of alternative mother-country flags. In the RS the Bosnian flag is largely absent. 
Bosnian Serb flag, closely resembling the Serbian tricolor, is dominant in the 
landscape.  According to opinion surveys, the new national anthem has faced similar 
fate: large majority of Bosnian Serbs consider the Serbian, rather than Bosnian, 
national anthem as reflecting their loyalties (Kostic, 2008). The design of the new 
Bosnian currency was likewise contested by the Bosnian Serbs. The initial idea 
proposed by the OHR according to which joint symbols would appear on the coinage 
was replaced by the decision whereby the entities had their respective cultural and 
historical figures printed in the notes that were circulated in their entities.  
In the case of Iraqi Kurds, in turn, the KRG coat of arms features the Kurdish 
eagle, a prominent visual symbol of Kurdish identity. It makes reference to a specific 
eagle species inhabiting the mountains of Kurdistan with qualities such as self-
reliance, strength and pride, that Kurds attribute to their nation. During interviews 
with Iraqi Kurdish political representatives on questions related to identity and 
independence, the Kurdish eagle and how it represents the characteristics of the 
Kurdish nation came up repeatedly. v  Another symbolic reference the eagle 
represents is Kurdish claims to an ancient ethnic history, as the eagle was the 
symbol of the Median empire that was located in today’s north-west Iran and south-
east Turkey between 678-549 BC. Kurdish nationalist historiography traces Kurdish 
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genealogy to the Medes. The use of the eagle also makes reference to the memory of 
Salahaddin, the first king of Egypt and Syria. Many archaeologists have claimed that 
the eagle, also used in the Egyptian coat of arms, is the personal symbol of King 
Salahaddin, who is believed to have Kurdish origins.  
Cartographic Practices 
A further feature central to the process of creating the national ‘self’ is the 
construction of a visual link between the group and territory. The use of ethnic 
demarcations such as street names and cartographic depictions has implications 
similar to those associated with the use of flags and emblems.  In the Bosnian case a 
number of different practices are readily observable. The communist and multi-
ethnic past has been rejected through the replacement of pre-war street names in 
the RS capital with those of Serb heroes and no references to the Muslim community 
have remained (Torsti, 2004). Renaming of public spaces and towns in accordance 
with ethnically-defined criteria are an essential part of creating alternative cultural 
narratives pertaining to nationhood. Other symbolic practices that challenge the 
very notion of Bosnian statehood pertain to cartographic representations of the 
nation. Maps are frequently used to make claims about identity and territory; 
schools, as well as weather forecasts, in the RS are found to use maps showing 
either the RS only or the RS represented as a distinct geographical space from 
Bosnia (Torsti, 2004).  This creates an association between purportedly ‘natural 
communities’ and ‘natural boundaries’ (Koskenniemi, 1994). 
In the Kurdish case, Kurdish nationalists, and those scholars who take the 
Kurdish nationalist historiography for granted, consider territorial attribution to be 
a key indicator of Kurdish ethnic identity (McDowall, 1996). Kurdish nationalist 
historiography claims that the use of ‘Kurdistan’ as a collective territory goes back 
over two thousand years. Although it was defined as a relatively small area in recent 
historical texts, today Kurdistan is presented as encompassing a much larger land. 
Greater Kurdistan is often depicted in maps and used as symbols of Kurdish identity 
both by Kurdish nationalists and outsiders. As examples of ‘propaganda cartography’ 
(O’Shea, 2004), maps of Kurdistan are used to assert the Kurdishness of the area 
and to justify Kurdish self-determination claims. Although Iraqi Kurdish nationalist 
organisations delimit their political goals to northern Iraq, they utilise the map of 
Greater Kurdistan as a national symbol.   
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to briefly explore the ways in which groups 
claiming to possess the right to self-determination generate and reproduce the ‘self’, 
or the people, on behalf of which they make such claims.  Creating and emphasising 
difference between the culture of the group in question and other groups in the 
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society functions as a way to represent the self-determining group as distinct people.  
In the above cases this has been done through a set of symbolic practices, entailing 
the use of dialects to create purportedly distinct languages as well as the use of state 
symbols and cartographic representations of the group’s territory.  
What the above discussion implies is that the often-cited conceptual shift 
from ethnic to territorial ‘selves’ as the basis of self-determination demands (Moore, 
1998) understates the continued salience of ethnic communities. This is not to 
endorse or legitimise primordial arguments but rather to highlight the ways in 
which such accounts are used to reproduce the people on whose behalf self-
determination claims can be made. Micro-level analysis of the construction of 
identities of self-determining groups provides thus significant insights to 
understanding the salience of the self-determination principle.  Although the above 
observations are subject to methodological caveats pertaining to the 
representativeness of the cases and more comparative work is undoubtedly needed 
to investigate further the aforementioned practices, it is nonetheless striking how 
cultural representations of the ‘self’ underpin even self-determination demands 
formulated in non-cultural terms. A case in point is the recent Scottish 
independence campaign. Whilst Scotland is represented as an ‘ancient nation’vi, 
much of the reasoning put forth by the yes campaign foregrounded the right of the 
Scottish people to have a government that reflects the priorities and values of the 
Scottish people rather than Westminster. This implies distinction between the 
Scottish and the English in that they are alleged to possess a different set of values 
and preferencesvii. 
 
 
                                                          
Notes 
 
i
 Notable exceptions are Rocher 2014; Economides 2013; McGarry and O’Leary 2010 
ii
 The claims made by Bosnian Serbs have largely shifted away from the demands to secession to the 
right to self-rule within Bosnia.  
iii A small number of Kurds reside in Armenia. 
iv http://www.aclweb.org/anthology/P13-2054 
v Interviews by Kaya during fieldwork in Erbil and Sulaimaniya, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, April-May 
2014.  
vi
 Scotland’s Future – Your Guide to an Independent Scotland’, p. viii. Available at: 
http://www.scotreferendum.com/reports/scotlands-future-your-guide-to-an-independent-
scotland/ 
vii Ibid, pp.viii-xi. 
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